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Executive Summary 
Only a few years ago, as the world’s supply of oil was showing evidences of peaking, it 
was almost certain that the world was slowly running out of its main source of energy. It 
was certain that the world needed to prepare for a peak oil situation, and prices were 
breaking records again and again. 
From this situation emerged a new player in the oil industry that has changed the oil 
market for the next decades: the US tight oil, also known as shale oil, industry. 
This revolution was made possible by the high prices of the years 2008-2014 as well as 
a favorable environment: low interest rates allowed the shale companies to finance 
themselves for cheap, mineral rights are guaranteed by law, and the country’s need for 
energy independence gave political support to this industry. 
From only a few thousand barrels per day in the beginning of this century, the tight oil 
industry grew swiftly, and produces today about 4.75 million barrels per day, which is 
more than Iraq, the fourth biggest producing country in the world. 
Obviously, this new player shook up the oil industry, and reshuffled the cards in the oil 
market. OPEC, and particularly Saudi Arabia, the biggest crude oil producer in the world, 
which has been able to influence global price of oil, is losing slightly its market power. 
This led to a significant change of strategy for the “oil cartel”, which decided in 2014 to 
maintain production levels and maintain their market share rather than cutting it to 
maintain high prices. 
This research focuses on the status of the swing producer, the producer that has this 
capacity of balancing the market of oil, preventing shortages or gluts. This “role” that has 
been held by Saudi Arabia since the 70’s, is now appearing to shift to the American shale 
producers. This study will present the actual state of the shale industry, to get a better 
understanding of the dynamics involved in this particular player in the oil market. Then, 
it will assess the characteristics of the swing producer and review of the previous swings 
of the global oil market. 
Then, it will analyze the implications of this new situation on the oil market. New varieties 
of crudes are available on the market, and the trade flows of both crude and refined oil 
products are changing.  
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By analyzing how shale oil is reshaping the oil industry, it will finally assess the 
implications of this new situation for the market, both today and in the future. 
By gathering and analyzing data and reports from the industry, specifically major factors 
such as prices, inventories, forward curves and trade flows, this study has come to the 
following conclusion: 
• The shale industry, while having different characteristics compared to the previous 
swing producers, is the new price maker of the oil market. 
• The emergence of this new player changed the rules in the oil game and forced 
conventional producers such as OPEC to adapt 
• The market is Entering a cycle of low prices that could last for years 
This research does not cover all the aspects linked to the shale industry. Therefore, it 
does not address concerns such as the potential pollutions caused by fracking activities. 
While these matters are relevant for someone who wants to assess the ecological impact 
of the shale industry, it is not in our opinion pertinent in the focus of our research.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 History of shale oil 
Crude oil, commonly referred to as petroleum or fossil fuel, is a liquid composed of 
hydrocarbons that is found in reservoir rocks. These reservoirs are geological formations 
which are permeable enough for the oil to flow. To be brief, when a producer wants to 
extract oil from these reservoirs, a hole needs to be drilled to access the oil. Then, a pipe 
is placed in the hole through which the oil is going to flow to the surface. 
Tight oil (also known as shale oil) on the other hand is found in low permeability 
reservoirs and is more difficult to extract. The extraction of tight oil is done through a 
process called hydraulic fracturing or “fracking”. In this process, after drilling vertically 
into the ground like in conventional wells, the producers drill horizontally into the rock 
and then use high pressurized water mixed with sand and chemicals to frack the rock, 
opening fissures that allow the oil trapped inside of the rock to escape and flow into the 
borehole. Fracking, by its complexity is more expensive than the extraction of crude oil. 
The wide varieties of crude produced around the world (density/sulfur content) have their 
specificities that differentiate one from the other. The quality of a crude can be measured 
with two characteristics that are its density (measured in API) and sulfur content. 
Density of a crude can be referred to as light or heavy, and sulfur content is described 
as sweet or sour. Light sweet crudes are usually sold with a premium compared to heavy, 
sour crudes. This comes from the distillation process of the crude and the end-products 
obtained: a light sweet crude will be easier to distillate and requires refineries that are 
less sophisticated and energy-intensive processes and give distillates that are more 
profitable, such as gasoline or diesel fuel, compared to a heavy sour crude that need 
specific refineries, has a higher impact on the environment, and give less desirable 
distillates. 
 
The oil extracted using the fracking process can have a wide range of API gravity and 
sulphur content, but is mainly light oil, which we will see later creates new challenges 
and opportunities when it comes to transportation and refining. 
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This process, while allowing access to oil and gas that 
would not be reachable with traditional extraction 
methods, is much more complex and costly than the 
process used to access conventional oil. For these 
reasons, the production of shale gas and oil was 
insignificant until 2006-2007, when high oil prices and 
technological progress created an incentive to extract oil 
from shale rocks. Since then, the production grew rapidly, 
from less than 400’000 barrels per day in 2006 to about 
4.1 million barrels per day in 2016, according to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration1, which represents 
more than half of the total U.S. crude production. 
 
Until now, the production and trade of tight oil was mainly limited to the United States 
who is accountable for more than 91% of the world’s tight oil production2, but wider 
reserves are proven to exist in the world   
  
                                               
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017. EIA 
2 Ref 1. 
Figure 1: U.S. oil production 
(Source: EIA 2017) 
U.S.A; 78.2
Russia; 74.6
China; 32.2
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Emirates; 22.6
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Australia2; 15.6
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Rest of the 
world; 89.3
Reserves of tight oil by country
Figure 2 : Reserves of tight oil by country (Source: EIA 2017) 
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 Dynamics 
When conventional oil wells 
decline at around 6% per year, 
Tight oil wells decline usually at 
a rate of 60% in the first year and 
25% in the second year. The 
result of the fast decline of the 
productivity of tight oil wells is 
that the industry has to drill and 
operate wells at a faster rate 
than in conventional fields. 
Moreover, the relative short term of the production cycle of a shale well implies in theory 
that shale producers should be more responsive to price signals than conventional oil 
producers. 
 
 The US shale oil Industry 
 
 
The shale oil industry is roughly 10-12 years old, when production costs and high prices 
allowed it to become profitable. 
As stated before, the U.S. production of tight oil started to become significant between 
2006 and 2008, when oil prices went up to historical highs (the West Texas Intermediate, 
the American benchmark for oil price broke the 140usd/bbl price point). During this 
Figure 3 Average oil production per well in the Permian region 
(Source: EIA 2017) 
 
Figure 4 U.S. petroleum consumption, production, 
imports, exports, and net imports (Source: EIA 2017) 
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period, the United-States imported more than 12 million of barrels of crude per day3 while 
producing between 5 and 6 million barrels per day. 
This tight oil boom, while allowing the United States to reduce their dependency on 
petroleum imports, enabled the country to become an important exporter of petroleum 
products (gasoline and diesel fuel mainly).  
But the shale industry, unlike conventional oil producers, which are mainly big 
multinationals or national oil companies (NOC), is composed of many smaller companies 
(fragmented), that produce from a few thousands up to 250’000 thousand barrels per 
day. The size and influences of these companies have a direct impact on the industry’s 
dynamics, with its qualities and defaults. These impacts are going to be developed in 
another chapter.  
The boom of the U.S. shale production has been mainly driven by three shale plays 
(regions): Eagle Ford, the Permian Basin and Bakken. These three areas have had a 
huge impact on the increased volumes of crude produced in the United States during the 
development of the tight oil industry, accounting together for 89% of the total tight oil 
production in the United States4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017. EIA 
4 Ref 3. 
Figure 5 Key tight oil and shale gas regions(Source: EIA 
2017) 
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1.3.1 The Bakken play 
The Bakken-THREE Forks tight oil play is a 
part of the Williston Basin, which is located 
across North Dakota, Montana and the 
province of Saskatchewan in Canada. 
 
The Bakken play has been the first to face 
a major increase in the production at the beginning of the « tight revolution ». Oil was 
first discovered in the region in 1951, and opened the door to the U.S. shale boom when 
an attempt of a combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing showed 
promising results and highlighted the possibility that tight oil reservoirs could be 
economically effective. 
Production in the Bakken shale oil play represents currently a million barrels per day, 
and according to the EIA, the Bakken region’s proved reserves of oil are as high as 5 
billion barrels. 
The basin is today the most mature of the tight oil plays in the USA. Maturity of a tight oil 
play is defined as “the amount of time during which producers have been drilling and 
producing from it using unconventional techniques such as horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing.”5 
The play’s production mainly relies on 10 major producers, who could lock up large areas 
of production when the shale rush began. These 10 producers are responsible for 75 to 
80 percent of the total play production.  
1.3.2 The Permian Basin 
Located in West Texas and extending to the south-east of New Mexico, the Permian 
Basin is approximately 250 miles wide and 300 long. The drilling in the Permian Basin 
began nearly a century ago, and the basin has produced nearly 30 billion barrels since 
the beginning of its exploitation. A production decrease started from the 1970’s until 
fracking started to be used. The development of fracking reversed the basin’s production 
                                               
5 CURTIS, Trisha, 2016. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
Figure 6 : The Bakken play oil production (Source: EIA 
2017) 
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decline, transforming it into a mixed conventional/unconventional oil play. The area’s 
activity surged when oil started to be extracted in significant quantities with the use of 
these new processes. 
With a production of more than 2.4 million of barrel per day, the Permian Basin is the 
biggest oil producing region of the United States, and a bigger oil producer than countries 
like Qatar and Angola. The strength of the production of the basin comes from various 
characteristics: the region contains important reserves of oil and gas. Oil reserves, as 
estimated in 2016, amounted to approximately 3.7 billion barrels6, and an assessment 
of the United States Geological Survey agency (USGS) estimated that the undiscovered 
and technically recoverable oil reserves in the “Wolfcamp” part of the basin (one of the 
six most producing region of the 
Permian area) were as high as 20 
billion barrels7. Nevertheless, 
these data are not showing the 
economic recoverability of the 
project that would need further 
prospects to be evaluated, but it 
shows that the Permian region has 
still a significant amount of 
reserves. 
Finally, Permian Fields are among the most profitable shale fields, some of them having 
a break-even price of 30USD, according to Pioneer Natural Resources Co.’s Chairman 
Scott Sheffield8 
                                               
6 BERMAN, Arthur, 2017. OilPrice 
7 United States Geological Survey Agency, 2017. USGS 
8 CAROLL, Joe, 2016. Bloomberg 
Figure 7 : Permian Region Oil production (Source: EIA 2017) 
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1.3.3 Eagle Ford 
The Eagle Ford’s shale activity is much younger than the two other regions presented 
above, but after the first wells were drilled in 2008, the play’s production quickly ramped 
up, reaching a production of 1 million barrel in less than 6 years and peaked at 1.6 million 
barrels per day before slowing down in 2015. As we will see later, the reduction is mainly 
due to the fall of prices that started in 2014, but the production is recovering since the 
beginning of 2017.  
Proved reserves in 2015 were of 4.3 billion 
barrels of crude in the region, making it the 
second biggest U.S. shale reservoir until today 
but higher costs of production in the region 
(break-even price in Eagle Ford is around 
50USD per barrel, much higher than the 
30USD price needed in the Permian region) 
affected the production of the play more 
heavily than the other major tight oil plays. 
 
 The tight oil Boom 
 
Since almost a decade, the shale industry had a major impact on the global energy 
business. In 2007, the US oil production started to raise for the first time since the peak 
production in the 1970s (see fig.1). This increase occurred after the production fell to 5 
million barrels per day. Today, the production is outperforming and back at around 9 
million barrels per days. It is expected that the US production exceeds Saudi-Arabia’s 
one and that the country become the world’s biggest producer of oil before the end of 
the decade9. 
The United States became a net exporter of Petroleum products (gasoline, diesel and 
other oil distillates) in 2011, thanks to the increase of the oil output inside the country10. 
                                               
9 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017. EIA 
10 Ref 8 
Figure 8 : Eagle Ford Region Oil production (Source: EIA 
2017) 
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The increase of the US production could also lead the country to be a net exporter of oil 
in the 2030’s, according to the EIA. The Congress decided in December 2015 to lift the 
ban on crude oil exports that had been in place since the embargo imposed by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in response to American aid to 
Israel during the Yom Kippur War in the 1970’s. 
This decision may have significant impacts on the global oil market. According to the 
American Foreign Policy Council, being self-sufficient and export crude allows the US to 
reduce its dependence on oil coming from the Middle East, improve the security of its 
energy supply, partners and allies. 
 
The Shale revolution, by reducing America’s need for importation of crude, is reshaping 
global oil markets. The surprisingly high amount of oil that producers can extract from 
shale formations, linked with their capacity to increase quickly the production and 
Figure 9 : U.S. Net Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products 
(Source: EIA 2017) 
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respond to price incentives, is re-orienting the market toward a “demand-driven” 
situation. 
Furthermore, until a few years ago, the common view was that global crude production 
would not be able to keep up with the growing needs, particularly with the development 
of emerging countries. Some would even say that we were reaching the global “peak oil” 
moment, when global production would start decreasing.  
The rise of the worldwide crude production, in the U.S, but also the Canadian Oil Sands 
and more traditional producers such as Russia and Gulf-countries proved that there was 
still crude to be pumped for many decades, if not centuries, if the price was high enough. 
The possibility to see America flood the market with its tight oil is good news for end 
consumers. They should, at the end, be the biggest winners of this situation. The market 
contains more actors which mean more diversified source of oil and more balanced 
supply and demand. This structure leads to less volatility and lower prices, but the 
situation threatens oil producers, who would suffer from a loss of power, market share 
and falling prices. 
But if we look back at the beginning of the decade, the WTI spot price was consistently 
between 90USD/bbl and 110USD/bbl, due to various factors such as the geopolitical 
situation in the Middle East, more precisely in oil producing countries such as Libya, Iraq 
or Iran. These issues led to a global supply shortage. The supply shortage linked to the 
low financing costs (interest rates have been historically low since the financial crisis of 
2007) created the perfect conditions for a rapid expansion of the tight oil industry: The 
producers could borrow the vast amounts of money they needed to start their drilling 
activities and were assured to be profitable. 
Figure 10 : Demand/Supply balance for crude oil 
(Source: EIA 2017) 
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Thus, the U.S. domestic production took off, and as shown previously, the quantity of 
crude imported in the country decreased significantly.  
The fall in U.S. crude imports, even if it had smaller implications in the global market due 
to the ban-export that was lifted only recently and the fact that the U.S. is still importing 
a large amount of oil, was inconvenient for the conventional oil-exports dependent 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia. The loss of significant demand from a reliable importer 
as are the U.S. (imports from OPEC Countries to the United States fell from nearly 6 
million of barrels per day in 2008 to a historically low 3.2 million of barrels per day in 
2014) was a threat to OPEC’s exports. 
Moreover, the large amount of crude that emerged from the fracking boom decreased 
significantly the price of domestically produced oil. The U.S. refiners had therefore 
access to low-priced crude, which inherently increased their production and exports of 
refined products, mainly gasoline and diesel, to Europe and Latin America (as distilled 
products were not subject to the export-ban). These countries having access to cheap 
refined products didn’t need as much crude for their own refineries, the imports of crude 
from the middle-east was reducing, threatening even more Arab oil’s market share. Add 
to that a slowing global demand and we can see that the prices (100 USD and more) of 
the beginning of the decade were not sustainable. 
Figure 11 : Petroleum trade: US imports (Source: EIA 2017) 
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The perspective to see this new player gaining a high market share in the global oil 
market was no good news for OPEC members, who are heavily dependent on oil exports 
to fuel their economy and balance their state budgets. Thus, when the prices started to 
fall in the middle of 2014, while everybody would have thought that OPEC was going to 
restrict their supply to the market to push the price up, they decided at their 166th meeting 
in November 2014 not to reduce output and to go for market share rather than preserving 
revenues.  
The aim of the strategy was not only to preserve OPEC’s countries market share, but 
also to “kill” the unconventional producers who had traditionally higher costs of 
extraction. At that time, shale’s extraction break-even costs were as high as 
80USD/barrel, when Saudi’s field costs of extraction were in the 5-10USD/barrel range. 
This was the beginning of the “price war” in the oil market which is still not over today. 
 The price war between US shale and OPEC 
For Ali al-Naimi, Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, it was a 
matter of time before the U.S. shale companies would grab enough market share to 
threaten Saudi Arabia’s revenues. To prevent this to happen, it was decided not to cut 
production. 
Production cut had, in the past, been followed by OPEC members with little to no 
commitment, most of the countries are reducing less than agreed or even not reducing 
their production at all. Therefore, it was unlikely that Saudis would push for a production 
cut that they would be the only one to follow, reducing in the same time their market 
share and revenues. 
After the announcement, the oil price that started to decline steadily since the middle of 
2014, crashed in the beginning of 2016, bottoming at less than 30 USD/barrel 
Shale producers didn’t start to suffer from these low prices before the middle of 2015 
because the production had been hedged against the price risk, giving them a bit of time 
before beginning to be harmed by the low prices. In the meantime, OPEC members, that 
received most of their state income from their national oil companies, encountered an 
important fiscal deficit, and had to use their reserves of foreign exchange to fuel their 
economies. Countries like Venezuela started to face severe political issues and even the 
Saudis, who had low production costs and generous reserves, could not stand this 
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situation for a long period. In fact, OPEC’s net oil export revenues fell from 933.5 billion 
USD in 2014 to 433.4 billion USD in 201611. 
U.S. oil production started to decline in June 2015, giving good hopes that Shale 
producers could be forced out of the market. Investment in oil exploration and production 
(E&P) in the United States fell by nearly 40%, followed in its fall by the number of rigs in 
operation, who went from 1539 in the end of 2014 to 330 in the middle of 2016. 
Although, the OPEC didn’t anticipate in their strategy the resilience of the U.S. tight 
producers. To survive, the tight oil industry had to become leaner and more efficient and 
the smaller companies who had a lower well performance, were the first to stop their 
activities, causing indirectly the average productivity to go up12. Then, the companies 
focused on exploiting the most productive wells, whereas before the price collapse the 
goal was to drill a maximum of them, without looking at efficiency. 
Finally, tight producers managed to make important efficiency gains on drilling and 
completing costs as well as reducing frack wastes. Those factors being combined, led 
the shale industry to become viable in a low-price environment. 
Therefore, even if service costs are expected to increase in the near future, there is no 
reason to expect that the industry will not survive after the price war. 
                                               
11 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016. EIA 
12 Ref 5. 
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On the other side, the low prices proved to be very costly for OPEC members, as they 
rely heavily on oil exports, and by extension on oil price. Their state budget being mainly 
constituted by oil revenues, a whole part of their income disappeared in a short period. 
 
The situation was therefore more dangerous for OPEC members than it was for the 
American, and when Al-Naimi retired in 2016, his successor, Khalid Al-Falih, decided to 
reverse the strategy that proven to be very costly and to push for production cuts in the 
cartel. The cuts were negotiated and announced at the end of 2016. The cartel, with 
other non-members like Russia, announced a reduction of about 1.8 million barrels. 
This announce, while pushing Brent price overs 50USD, did not seem to have a major 
impact like past cuts had. It highlighted a new situation in the market: OPEC could have 
lost its ability to influence the market and the prices by adjusting its output. The following 
part of this research will address whether OPEC, and by extension the Saudis, are still 
the “Swing” producers on the oil market, or if the shale industry changed the balance of 
power in the market sufficiently enough to remove these characteristics and become the 
new “Swing”.  
Figure 12 : Fiscal break-even price for OPEC member countries (Source: 
CNBC 2015) 
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2. Analysis 
This chapter will first define what is a “swing producer”, what are the characteristics that 
a producer needs to have to be considered as swing and the implication for the market 
to have a swing producer or none. Then I will try to analyze whether the U.S. shale 
industry is or is not able to act as swing on the market.  
Regarding the definition of a swing producer, the ARC Energy Research Institute 
describes it as: “a supplier that has a large amount of spare capacity; so much so that they 
can influence market prices by ratcheting their output up or down at will.” Swing producers 
therefore act as market regulators, by balancing the supply to meet the demand, and 
therefore to keep the prices high and stable.  
A swing producer aims to keep the price high enough to take the most profits, but in the 
meantime, keep it under a certain ceiling to discourage alternatives. By doing that, the 
swing producers reduce volatility. 
 Characteristics of a swing producer 
2.1.1 Market share 
Indeed, to be able to have an impact on the global supply and be considered as swing, 
a producer should have a market share that is high enough to influence the global supply. 
As the world’s leaders in oil production, the United States Russia and OPEC/Saudi 
Arabia are the three countries that are the most likely to have the critical mass needed 
to have the ability to influence the global oil price, with the exception of unpredictable 
events such as major supply disruptions that could happen, for instance, during a war. 
As said previously, regarding the market share on crude oil production, there are three 
major players within the industry. Russia and Saudi Arabia account each for 13% of the 
global production, whereas the United States are a bit below and have 11% of the market 
share. Finally, OPEC’s market share is of 44% (2017 data). These relatively big 
percentages of global production enable these three countries and the OPEC to be the 
key influencers in the market.  
Focusing on tight oil production, the United States accounts for 92% of the total 
production (4.1 million b/d in June 2016). Canada which is the only other producer and 
produces 0.38 million b/d in January 2016) 
  
 
Shale, the new oil swing producer? 
  
Gregory HUTIN 15 
 
2.1.2 Spare capacity 
The spare capacity of a country or region has a crucial role in its ability to meet the 
demand. According to EIA, the definition of this term is: “an output that can be turned on 
within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days”. Spare capacity is mainly used when 
the market faces a supply-demand imbalance following several unexpected events such 
as natural disasters, crisis and wars. This means that a country that has the capacity to 
quickly supply a significant amount of oil is able to stabilize the market. 
Having a sufficient spare capacity is essential for a producer to be considered as swing, 
because without it, it is impossible for a producer, even the biggest, to balance the 
market. 
OPEC always applied a strategy that consists of producing a high level of oil and 
simultaneously maintaining an optimal spare capacity. Some external factors influenced 
the levels of spare resources such as the non-OPEC countries production increase. In 
such trends, the supply Shifts upwards and the spare capacity is not consumed. 
As we can see in figure 13, OPEC’s spare capacity varied widely from one year to 
another in the last 16 years. It was low when prices where high, showing the cartel’s goal 
of ensuring that the market was well supplied, and high when prices where low, showing 
production cuts, to support prices.  
Figure 13 : OPEC production spare capacity (Source: EIA 2017) 
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2.1.3 Low production costs 
To be swing, the producers need to have low production costs. Being able to diminish 
these costs, allows the producers to stay profitable even if the prices are weak and thus, 
being still able to influence the market. 
As we can see in figure 14, Middle East producers tend to have the lowest production 
costs (per barrel). Shale producers, by being on the upper side of the curve, could be 
seen as less able to operate when prices were not high enough. When the prices 
dropped in 2014, the shale industry was expected to suffer massively and that it would 
lead to an output reduction. 
But it didn’t happen. Contrary to expectations, shale producers were able to drive their 
costs down. Several factors led to this situation, for instance, improvements in the 
exploration and fracking methods. Some companies were even able to “re-frack” already 
used wells with new techniques.  
Frackers are now able to find the most profitable places to drill, i.e. the wells that will give 
the most of oil for the lower price, which has a significant impact on the cost curve.  
 
Figure 14 : Oil production cost curve (Source: BP energy outlook 2015) 
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 Historical swing producers 
2.2.1 1930’s to 1970’s: the Texas Railroad Commission 
To better understand the role of a swing producer, we can take a look at the past, when 
the US oil industry used to regulate the oil supply to match the demand, and therefore, 
keep prices stable. 
At the end of the 1920’s, the development of the worldwide oil production led to an 
oversupply that was threatening the whole industry. The price fell as low as 10 cents per 
barrel in mid-1931, which forced the US government, who was trying to restore the 
industry after the 1929 crisis, required the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) and other 
oil producing organizations to put in place oil production restriction to equilibrate supply 
and demand in the market. TRC was then responsible for the control of most of the spare 
capacity of the US industry13. 
At the time, posted price of oil in each country considered the freight expenses from the 
crude’s production plan to the US gulf coast. It allowed to have a more transparent and 
comparable price. 
By controlling the amount of oil produced in Texas, TRC had a major grip on the US 
spare capacity and by extent, on the US gulf coast posted price. Consequently, TRC had 
the ability to exercise control on the global crude price. 
By balancing the supply, and as long as the US spare capacity was important enough to 
adjust it to the demand, TRC was acting as swing producer. This situation lasted from 
the 30’s until the 70’s, when the American oil production peaked before starting to 
                                               
13 DOWNEY, Morgan, 2009. Oil101. 
Figure 15 : Development in wellhead breakeven price for key shale 
plays (Source: Rystad Energy NASWellCube 2016) 
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decrease, when the “peak oil” happened. At this time, North American producers were 
no longer able to adapt their production to the demand, and therefore lost the ability to 
regulate the market and the price. A rather new player in the market took over the role 
of swing producer: OPEC 
2.2.2 1970’s: OPEC’s rise as the new swing 
Founded in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, OPEC’s goal is to 
“co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure 
fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply 
of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the 
industry”14. The countries at the origin of the organization wanted to unite to gain better 
power over the market and over the major oil companies, in order to obtain better prices 
and greater share of the benefits created by the oil production. 
The power of OPEC over the oil market appeared in 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, 
when the organization placed an oil-export embargo on the United States for supporting 
Israel in the war. The embargo pushed the price of crude from 3 usd/bbl up to 12 usd/bbl 
from September 1973 until March 1974, leading to what would be called later the “first 
oil shock”. 
The first outcome from the embargo was that OPEC was the new swing producer in the 
oil market. The second one was that while oil demand is quite inelastic in the short-term, 
sustained high prices lead oil consuming countries to look for and develop alternatives. 
That is why OPEC decided afterwards to look for price stability rather than just high 
prices, to offer a stable and sufficient supply to consumers while ensuring a strong 
income to the producers. 
 Importance of hedging for the shale producers 
A major issue in the shale oil industry is the important need for financing, as wells have 
rapid decline rates and producers must drill continuously if they want to produce. As seen 
previously, a well is mainly productive in the first operating years. To be able to secure 
high rates of return and attract investors, producers are heavily hedging their positions.  
                                               
14 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 2007. OPEC 
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Although the market is facing a low price per barrel, the high variety of hedging 
instruments being used keeps the shale industry attractive to investors. The relatively 
high utilization of hedging instruments is therefore specific to this market. For instance, 
Russia and gulf states don’t secure themselves in this way as they are considered as 
too big to hedge. Furthermore, the market is more often on backwardation which is not 
suited for hedging (Appendix 1). The shale oil producers hedge their position to lock in 
margins. If OPEC is not considering extending the cuts anymore, oil prices will tend to 
decline and producers that hedged would gain out of it. 
 Inventories 
Oil stockpiles can give good insights about the global state of the oil market. Inventories 
and oil prices tend to be highly correlated: When inventories are diminishing, one can 
expect that the oil price will increase and vice versa. 
Therefore, this metric shows evidence of the balance between supply and demand: an 
excess of supply will be forcing producers to stock the surplus of quantities, and 
shortages will drain the inventories. 
To gather information about the state of inventories, the market usually looks at the 
weekly report published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The EIA 
gathers inventory data on crude oil and various energy products from American 
companies. This report is established using the most reliable data about inventories 
available. 
 
2.4.1 Trying to reduce the inventories  
The US supply growth, linked with a lower than expected global demand for oil, led to an 
excess of supply that originated an oil glut that was even aggravated by the Saudi’s 
decision to maintain production. As shown in figure 10, the market was oversupplied 
between 2014 and 2016. This glut is at the origin of the drop-in oil prices that began in 
2014. 
After two years of laissez-faire, OPEC announced in November 2016 that it would cut 
production to clear this global glut. The organisation, with external partners such as 
Russia, planned to cut output by 1.8 million barrels a day in an attempt to drain 
inventories. The cut was expected to normalize inventories and supply by the middle of 
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the year 2017, but the fluctuating compliance of OPEC-members, linked with the 
development of other producers (such as the shale industry), shows that the strategy 
could take much more time to succeed than the six months originally planned. 
Figure 16 shows the reported level of stockpiles in the United States. As we can see, the 
production cuts didn’t have a significant impact on the inventory levels for the last 9 
months, reducing it by only 4%. 
At a more global level, as we can see in figure 
17, while the stock levels are diminishing 
since March, we are still at higher levels than 
the 2012-2016 average. 
Moreover, according to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) : “Crude holdings drew 
more than twice as much as usual in June, by 
15.6 million barrels to 1’194 million barrels. 
Most of the draw took place in the US due to 
high refinery runs, which ate into crude surpluses.”15. We can assume therefore that the 
reduction of crude stockpiles is only partially attributable to supply reduction. 
                                               
15 International Energy Agency, 2017. IEA 
Figure 17 : OECD total oil stocks (Source: IEA 
2017) 
Figure 16 : U.S. crude stock levels (Source: EIA 2017) 
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OPEC extended the cuts for a longer period than the 6 months originally planned and is 
currently discussing another extention. This would send a clear signal to the market of 
the cartel’s determination to reach its target. But the cuts are expensive for these 
countries, whose finances rely heavily on oil exports. Moreover, it remains uncertain if 
they have the reserves to sustain these cuts. 
 
The goal behind this inventory reduction strategy is to drive the market from a contango 
to a backwardation situation. The shape of the future curve, as an indicator of the 
changes in the oil’s supply and demand balance, is an important value when trying to 
understand the state of the oil market.  
Additionally, as shale producers hedge a much higher percentage of their production 
than conventional producers, the shape of the forward curve has a more important effect 
on the former rather than the latter. 
The contango, which allows shale producers to hedge their production at a higher than 
spot price, ensures them to lock-in their margins in the future and allow them to reduce 
their price exposure, as long as price is higher than their production costs. This situation 
allows them to gain broader access to financing, to increase their investments and drilling 
capabilities and consequently, to drive the production up. 
In the same time, conventional oil producers such as Saudi Arabia do not hedge their 
production and prefer to sell on the spot market or long-term contracts. They do not take 
out benefits from a contango situation. 
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Therefore, switching from contango to backwardation could be the solution that would 
allow OPEC to increase its production levels without facing a new tight oil boom. 
Furthermore, as shown by figure 18, backwardation has been related in the past to high 
oil prices while the contango structure (and particularly the super-contango of 2008) was 
linked to low/decreasing oil prices.  
 
3. Discussion 
 Marginal producer vs swing producer 
When trying to assess the capacity of the US shale industry to act as a swing, one must 
differentiate the role of the swing producer from the marginal producer. 
The swing producer act in the short-term to balance supply and demand on the market, 
by absorbing supply shocks. Its role is to flatten the price curve in the short run. 
On the other hand, the marginal barrel represents the last barrel of oil sold. In basic 
economics, the price of a product in a competitive industry will be equal to the marginal 
Figure 18 : Relation between contango/backwardation and crude price (Source: Marketrealist 2017) 
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cost of production. If we apply this principle to the oil industry, we can link the marginal 
producer to represent the producer for whom Price = Marginal Cost. Furthermore, as 
shown in Figure 19, long-term price of the forward curve is supposed to represent the 
marginal cost, plus a premium or minus a discount for delivery according to the market 
structure.  
The marginal producer will therefore be the one who will drive long-term prices of oil. 
 Willingness to act as swing producer 
For many analysts, Saudi Arabia’s intentions to act as a price-maker is the main 
characteristic that allow us to call the kingdom a swing producer. But in my opinion, while 
it is true that it reinforced the country’s influence on the market, it isn’t necessary a 
characteristic of a swing, and the intention of acting as swing producers is not always 
easy to track, as oil production reports and official statements do not always represent 
the truth. 
For example, Saudi Arabia had been officially for the last 30 years unwilling to act as 
swing producer, as stated by Ali Al-Naimi in 1998: 
” Saudi Arabia tried in the past to play the role of the swing producer by reducing 
production to maintain a specific price, but the result was unfavourable to the kingdom. 
Even though its production fell from more than 10 million bpd in 1980 to less than 3 
million bpd in 1985, prices collapsed. As a result, the kingdom not only lost in terms of 
Figure 19 : Oil Price Formation: Spot Price and the Forward Curve (Source: FTI Consulting 2016) 
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prices but also lost its market share at that time. We have abandoned once and for all 
the role of swing producer”16. 
But it would be wrong to think that the country did not act to balance the market and 
establish what it considered to be the “fair price” of oil. The country participated actively 
in the last cuts agreed by OPEC, in 2008, 2001 and 1998. 
On the other hand, the US shale industry cannot be qualified as willing to act as a swing 
producer. The industry is constituted of many small producers that are pursuing 
profitability and have the intention to maximize output at each price levels. 
 
 A new landscape in the oil business 
The shale energy revolution reshaped the market considerably and it will surely have a 
significant impact in the long term. The surprising adaptation of the industry on the falling 
prices of 2014, leads us to think that the market has changed. and it is likely that the 
price per barrel of WTI won’t exceed 60 USD in the short run long term prices around 
production costs (currently in the 52-53usd range).. 
Moreover, the OPEC’s decision to waive its swing producer status during the 166th 
meeting in November 2014, evidences the market transformation. Indeed, the cartel’s 
decision to hold the same production levels, shows its resignation, at least in the near 
future, to let the market drive the barrel price. The inefficiency of the current OPEC’s 
production cut to reduce inventories and lower the prices in a more comfortable situation 
for the member states, that struggle to set their fiscal budgets at current price levels, 
leads us to think that the U.S. are the new swing producers in the oil industry and not 
only marginal producers. OPEC’s member states face the previous issue since they set 
their fiscal budget according to what was considered as a fair price for the market in 2012 
and 2013 between 100 and 120 usd/barrel. The fall in price levels in 2014 significantly 
reduced their revenues that rely heavily on oil income for their budget balance.  
Currently, the shale industry has more characteristics of a standard oil producer than the 
other oil producers. It takes much less time for shale producers to bring new barrels on 
the market than for other producers and the data are evident. According to the Goldman 
                                               
16Reuters, 2017. 
  
 
Shale, the new oil swing producer? 
  
Gregory HUTIN 25 
Sachs research group, a shale producer needs approximately 14 days to bring those 
new barrels to the market. On the other hand, conventional producers may need up to 
10 years between capital commitment and production start in the case of deep water 
projects. That been said, an oil price increase attracts instantly new investors in the 
industry that will quickly bring an increase in the production capacity. The total production 
level can be rapidly adjusted depending on the market conditions. By comparison, a 
traditional production process requires significantly higher investments, particularly in the 
case of an off-shore production where the production level is less modulable once online. 
3.3.1 A less-cartelized market 
Presently, the market tends to behave as a free market: a lot of buyers and sellers are 
entering the market. It is the very first time that we see the oil market acting like a free 
market. 
The market’s supply curve is much flatter today (appendix 4). Previously, if the opec 
added or removed barrels in the market, it had a much higher impact because no one 
was able to react quickly and bring or withdraw new barrels to compensate. The 
significant amount of time that is required to start a new project and the incapacity to 
modulate the production levels of existing wells didn’t offer an optimal situation to adapt 
to the market. Now, with the shale industry booming, the situation has changed. It is 
unlikely that OPEC has a sufficient impact on the market to influence the prices 
sustainably. 
The market is therefore operating in a much more liberalized manner nowadays. If opec 
wants to take back its swing producer status, it should bring together a large number of 
producers. This is what they did by inviting Russia, that is not a member country, to follow 
the cut to reduce the global production cut even more. Nevertheless, it looks difficult if 
not impossible that OPEC achieves this objective: this would imply that the organization 
negotiates with more countries, that don’t especially have the same interests as the 
cartel, and this would harm even more the control on the production cuts. The market 
mechanisms are going to behave as in a competitive market in the coming years. 
 Trade flow Changes 
3.4.1 A glut in the U.S. oil market 
The important increase in the crude oil production in the US is a game changer in the 
pricing mechanism of oil, with the us shale industry becoming the new swing. But it is 
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also reshaping the trade flows of oil: by adding nearly 5 million barrels per day of light 
sweet crude in the U.S. market, shale created new challenges to the oil market, in the 
U.S. for sure, but also in the global market. This new supply created a glut of light sweet 
in the U.S. market. Transportation and refineries were not prepared for this sudden 
increase. First, existing transportation infrastructures were not adapted to transport 
crude from U.S. inland production fields to refineries that are mainly located in coastal 
regions. The transportation bottleneck created a steep discount for the U.S. benchmark 
WTI in the years 2010-2011 compared to the European Brent, as shown in Appendix 1, 
creating price arbitrage opportunities. Ultimately, new infrastructures helped to reduce 
price gaps but highlighted a new problem: refineries in the U.S. are mainly designed to 
handle medium to heavy types of crudes and are not able to process the increasing 
amount of light sweet that shale wells typically produce. Therefore, one would suggest 
exporting the barrels in excess during the time that the refining industry needed to adapt 
itself to this new situation. But the export ban that was in place since the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act of 1975 forbad the exports of crude from the U.S. to another place 
than Canada, who took profit of this supply of cheap light crude. The Canadian were at 
the time dependent on light crude imports because the heavy oil produced in the country 
needs to be blended with lighter crude in order to flow through pipelines.  
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Therefore, as we can see in Figure 20, nearly all the U.S. exports of crude oil went to 
Canada. And many voices called for a lift of the export-ban that was harming the U.S. oil 
producers by distorting prices and creating market inefficiencies. 
3.4.2 The US lift the crude export ban 
In December 2015, the U.S. Congress lifted the export ban, and the result did not take 
long to appear. The Brent-WTI spread decreased sharply as shown in Appendix 1, the 
U.S. exports increased to as high as 0.7 million barrels per day and the export 
destinations diversified dramatically, showing that the market is gaining efficiency from 
the lifting of the ban. 
  
Figure 20 : U.S. Exports of Crude Oil (Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2017) 
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3.4.3 Reshuffling of the Cards 
 
One of the biggest impact of the shale revolution and the recent developments of the 
global oil market is the rebalancing of the worldwide trade flows of oil, starting with the 
United States. 
Figure 21 shows the evolution of oil imports in the United States from 2004 to 2014. The 
graph highlights first the dramatic decrease of total imports in the country, and the 
reshaping of the oil sources. We can see that the country reduced its imports from most 
of the regions of the world except for Canada, even becoming a net exporter of oil to 
Europe. 
The country is now less dependent on high risk country such as African and Latin 
American countries. This means a higher energy security for the country as well as an 
improved trade balance for the US economy.  
For the exporting Countries on the other side, the rise of the United States as an oil 
exporter, linked with the current supply glut and the low prices bring new challenges. As 
shown in Appendix 2 and figure 22, oil trade flows, particularly from the middle east, are 
shifting from western countries to Asia. The second point that we can see in appendix 2 
is the increasing of complexity of the oil trades around the world. 
Figure 21 : US net oil imports, thousands of barrels per day (Source: Carbon Brief 2016) 
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This can be attributed in our opinion to two factors:  
First is OPEC’s strategy of reducing OECD inventories and second is targeting more 
sustainable consumers of oil, as western countries are reducing their oil consumption 
due to efficiency gains and political incentives to push for an energy transition. 
The first point is linked to the visibility of the western countries inventories. Stockpile 
levels are more reliable and published more frequently in western countries, particularly 
in the United States, where data are published on a weekly basis. Therefore, they have 
a higher impact on the oil price than Asian stockpiles that are not published officially and 
are usually difficult to evaluate. By shifting exports from these developed countries to 
Asian countries, particularly China, OPEC try to reduce these highly visible inventories. 
The second point is more linked to OPEC’s need of keeping a high market share in the 
countries that will account for most of the demand growth in the future. Oil consumption 
in Europe is slowly declining since the middle of the 2000’s, and the current trend of 
reducing fossil fuels needs let us think that Europe’s oil imports could never recover. 
 
 A few thoughts on the future of oil prices 
At the time of redaction of this paper, WTI futures for next month delivery trade at around 
50$/bbl. Due to the new market conditions linked with the status of shale as swing 
producer, and as stated earlier, it appears unlikely to us that the WTI price will break 
Figure 22 : Middle East net oil exports, thousands of barrels per day (Source : Carbon Brief 2016) 
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through the 60$/bbl in the short-run, due to remaining high inventories and excess of 
supply. But in the mid-term run (until 2019), several factors will be important to monitor: 
• The growth of global demand 
• The capacity and willingness of OPEC to sustain or extend its production cuts 
• Potential other supply disruption 
• The evolution of shale industry, particularly its capacity to sustain low cost 
production 
While we must be cautious when making price forecasts, it appears clearer and 
clearer than the status of shale as swing producer is likely to create a strong 
resistance to price increase, at least for the next 2 to 3 years. 
As we can see in Figure 23, a majority of analysts foresee the Brent price to be in a 
50 to 80 usd/bbl range in 3 years from now, and the forecasts are narrowing from 
year to year if we compare to previous estimations. That means that the market is 
more and more conscious of the role of shale as swing producer. 
 
Figure 23: Distribution of 3 years ahead Brent forecasts (Source: Goldman Sachs 2017) 
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4. Conclusion  
When assessing if the shale oil industry has effectively become the swing producer of 
the oil market, we must look at how it managed to deal with the challenges it faced in the 
past three years, which it did surprisingly well: 
The Industry demonstrated its capacity to not only survive in a low-price 
environment, but also show signs of development 
When prices fell in fall 2014, many analysts forecasted that shale production would 
crash. While total output effectively decreased slowly until late 2016, it recovered and 
reached new records in august 2017, proving that it is now profitable in the current price 
environment. 
Today, shale represents 4.75 million barrels per day, more than Iraq or Lybia 
The high market share needed to endorse the role of swing producer is also reached by 
the shale industry. But even more important than that, shale represents today the 
dominant technology in the oil market. 
Shale has the capacity to ramp-up production quickly in response to price signals, 
much quicker than conventional oil producers 
The short time period between investment and production (weeks vs years for 
conventional projects) allows it to react quickly to market signals, bringing stability to oil 
prices. 
The industry defeated OPEC in the price War of 2014-2016 
The price war started by the cartel in 2014 turned to the advantage of the shale industry, 
as OPEC’s countries suffered heavily from the fall in prices. For example, Venezuela is 
on the verge of bankruptcy, and other, more solid countries still face huge public deficit. 
In an attempt to slash inventories and push prices higher, OPEC put in place a production 
cut in late 2016, but with little success so far. While it is expected to be reconducted for 
2018, some countries already announced that they could not continue to cut their 
production anymore. This leads us to think that the previous swing is not anymore. 
For these reasons, we think that the shale industry is indeed the new swing producer of 
the oil market.  
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The impact of the shale revolution on the oil market goes far beyond the status of swing 
producer, it has a profound impact on the dynamics of the oil market:  
Shale changed the trade flows of oil durably, bringing more complexity for sure, 
but allowing for new opportunities 
The reduction of the US need for foreign crude forced conventional producers to look for 
new ways of selling their oil, with OPEC redirecting their exports to Asian countries. The 
oil glut in the country also brought challenges for the transportation and refining 
industries while creating new opportunities for arbitrage. 
It put a ceiling on price that is at least going to last a few years in our opinion. The 
oil market is now in a situation that looks like the one we had in the 80’s 
As the supply curve flattened in recent years, it appears unlikely that the price of oil will 
come back any soon to the high levels that we have seen in the past ten years. The 
market will be most likely well supplied in the next years to come, but we might see a 
slowing of the supply in the longer run. 
A lack of investment in more expensive projects could lead to a reduction of 
supply in a long-term horizon, which may bring a new “high prices” cycle as the 
one we saw in the years 2008-2014 
Low prices forced producers to cut investments in new conventional projects, and strong 
demand growth could lead to a tighter oil market after 2020. 
The global need to reduce fossil fuels consumption to fight against global 
warming may bring the world to a “peak demand” scenario 
The energy transition that is pushed forward to fight against greenhouse gas emissions, 
illustrated by the efficiency gains and the development of substitutes for oil may result in 
the global demand for oil peaking before the supply. While this scenario is unlikely to 
happen before 2025 or 2030, it will still have a strong impact on the oil market: Oil 
producing countries would have to diversify their economies, and the industry must start 
to address this possibility. 
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In summary, it appears evident for us that shale is the new key-player in the oil market. 
It reshaped the oil market in such an important way, and will continue to do so in the next 
years, that underestimating it when analysing the oil market would be a mistake.  
We hope that this work may prove useful to people interested in the recent development 
of the oil market, and would like to thank all those who participated to its elaboration, by 
their support and advices.  
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Appendix 1: Brent-WtI spread 
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Appendix 2: Major trade flows of oil, 2004/2016 
Comparison 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2005 
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Appendix 3: Global oil consumption (in million barrels 
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Appendix 4 : Breakeven cost of non-plateau oil assets, 
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